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The Entrepreneurial Subject and the 
Objectivization of the Self in Social Media
The Production of the Self in Social Media
Recent studies on labor and social media have 
emphasized the idea of prosumption: a confluence 
of production and consumption, first described 
by Alvin Toffler (1980). Much of the research in 
this area has appropriated Dallas Smythe’s (1977) 
conception of the “audience commodity” and its 
work—the idea that TV programmers produce 
audiences to sell to advertisers, and in the process 
audiences work to produce themselves as an “audi-
ence commodity” by learning to buy the products 
advertised on TV. Similarly, social media users 
can be said to be producing a “prosumer commod-
ity” by producing the data that corporate social 
media companies use to sell to advertisers (Fuchs 
2014; see also Andrejevic 2013; Cohen 2008; 
Dyer-Witheford 1999; Manzerolle 2010; and 
Mosco 2009). The idea of the prosumer commod-
ity, I believe, offers an adequate way of conceiving 
users’ exploitation on corporate social media plat-
forms, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
others. There is also an added ideological dimen-
sion to the kind of exploitation of labor that we see 
in this instance: because social media involves 
play, on the one hand, and participatory political 
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and cultural communication (i.e., organizing solidarity campaigns, commu-
nity, etc.; perhaps the production of a new public sphere) on the other, and 
because use is apparently voluntary, it is difficult to see how it is a mecha-
nism of exploitation. Jodi Dean (2002, 2009, 2010) has dubbed the latter 
“communicative capitalism,” signifying the way in which the Internet pro-
motes the ideals of democracy while actually reinforcing stronger forms of 
capitalist exploitation and control. Detractors of this position may argue that 
even if users are central to the production of content that generates profit for 
corporate social media sites, the service they provide the site is in effect paid 
for by the service that users receive from the social media platform. Fuchs 
(2014) has indicated the fallacy of these kinds of arguments by demonstrat-
ing that the value users produce through their willful inscription of personal 
data into the matrices of social media databases far outweighs the value of 
the service provided by corporate social media. The Internet prosumer com-
modity is, in fact, made of the massive amounts of data (“big data”) that 
social media companies package and sell to advertisers (and hand over to 
government surveillance agencies, such as the National Security Agency—
hence the term “dataveillance”).
However, there is another, albeit still ideological, way to approach the 
problem of social media labor. The conception of the prosumer commodity in 
some ways seems to hint at the idea of ideology as “false consciousness.” The 
user, in this instance, remains unaware that the use of social media consti-
tutes a form of labor, let alone exploited labor. Here, we are at the level of ideo-
logical critique in the form of “truth as revelation”—that is, if people knew 
the truth, they would revolt. However, it is necessary to note some of the func-
tional elements of subjectivization involved in the use of social media. We 
should recognize, for instance, the prevalent use of social media not only for 
play or participatory culture but also, and increasingly, for the purpose of 
work-related activities; the professional social media site LinkedIn is surely 
the most obvious example, designed as it is specifically for the purpose of pro-
fessional networking. In the context of an increasingly precarious labor force, 
sites like LinkedIn have become essential for maintaining work- and busi-
ness-related contacts. LinkedIn thus serves as a model for understanding 
much of the activity in which people are now engaged on social media—that 
is, social media use as work. Social media, in this respect, have become a plat-
form for the performance and presentation of a commodified Self.
Here, I am using the category of the (capital “S”) Self to distinguish it 
from that of the “subject.” The Self, I claim, is an alienated representation of 
the subject, congealed in the form of the signifier (or the Lacanian master 
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signifier), which for Lacan represents the subject for the Other. As a signi-
fier, the Self materially obfuscates the subject; and, in the psychoanalytic 
context, the subject remains unaware of this and constitutes her identity, in 
part, by misrecognizing the signifier as a fuller representation of her-Self. 
The subject performs her identity as a Self through the signifier that acts as 
the image of her ideal Self viewed from the perspective of the Other.1
What I have in mind with the idea of “performing” the Self on social 
media is closely connected to constructions of reputation, or what Alison 
Hearn (2010) refers to as the “digital reputation economy.” Hearn describes 
a process of “self-branding” in which the subject is transformed into a “com-
modity for sale on the labor market[, which] must also generate its own rhe-
torically persuasive packaging” (427). She adds that, “nowadays, social 
media like Twitter or Facebook provide a new ‘protocol’ for social relations; 
they allow individuals’ personal connections to become more durable [and] 
representable” (429). Since social media make our connections and images 
of the Self more “durable” and “representable,” they can be seen as objectiv-
ized facets of the Self. They objectivize our “digital reputation.”2
“Self-branding” or “reputation management” on social media presents 
one aspect of the neoliberal subjectivization of individuals as “entrepre-
neurs-of-the-self.” As one report explains, “Reputation management has 
now become a defining feature of online life for many internet users . . . ”; 
because “search engines and social media sites play a central role in building 
one’s reputation online,” social media users must be “careful to project 
themselves online in a way that suits specific audiences” (Madden and Smith 
2010). One discerns in this passage the type of “rational choice” rhetoric 
employed by neoliberal advocates of entrepreneurial ethics. The public pro-
file on social media platforms has become less an open space of communica-
tion and self-identification than a place for exhibiting and curating (see 
Hogan 2010) the (professional/entrepreneurial) Self.
My choice of distinguishing between the Self and the subject is strate-
gic given the critical stance I propose in what follows on the conception of 
the entrepreneurial subject in social media. The Self, I claim, represents an 
objectivization (read as reification) of the subject. The Self that is produced 
on social media is therefore not a “subject” but, rather, part of a process of 
reifying the subject. The ideology of social media works by objectivizing the 
subject rather than by producing subjectivity. My conception therefore 
stands in opposition to Michel Foucault’s (2008) definition of the neoliberal 
subject in his lectures on “biopolitics.” I demonstrate that the entrepreneur-
ial ethics of neoliberalism involve the further reification of the subject, as an 
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object-commodity that I am calling the Self, exemplified by the profile page 
so ubiquitous on social media. Although it may be conceived as an element 
of subjectivity and identity formation in the Information Society, I contend 
that the construction of the public profile page represents instead the objec-
tivization of the subject.
Whereas Foucault claims that the neoliberal subject produces herself 
as subject, I argue instead that the neoliberal subject works to further objec-
tivize the Self. Although Foucault’s analysis is based on the idea that we are 
dominated through the mandate to become subjects, I claim that this 
demand is in fact one of objectivization rather than subjectivization. As well, 
with the rising necessity for “self-branding,” in the context of a post-Fordist 
society that relies increasingly on contract and precarious labor, the time 
spent outside of “work time,” or the time when labor-power is put to use—
what we are used to thinking of as leisure time, and (in Marxian terms) the 
time spent on the reproduction of labor-power—now becomes subdivided in 
order to include the time necessary for the promotion of the Self, understood 
in neoliberal terms as investing in one’s own human capital. I argue, instead, 
that the objectivization, and hence the commodification, of the Self in social 
media functions as an additional form of unpaid free labor in contemporary 
neoliberal capitalism. Self-promotion is simply an added aspect to the neo-
liberal ideology of entrepreneurialism, and social media provide the space 
that facilitates its operation.
The Neoliberal Subject
Two important differences distinguish the liberal subject from the neolib-
eral subject. On the one hand, the liberal subject can be characterized as a 
free laborer. On the other hand, he is also a subject of exchange. In the lib-
eral conception of the market, both capital and labor represent positions of 
free agency—both are free and equal individuals (in the eyes of the law), 
endowed with rights, who enter into the market and agree to a “fair” 
exchange of labor-power for wages. The latter would be impossible to con-
ceive as equitable without a subject who is free to enter into the market and 
exchange a commodity for a price. Where the liberal subject is one of rights 
before the eyes of the law, the neoliberal subject, in contrast, is “human cap-
ital,” no longer the subject of exchange but of competition (see Feher 2009). 
In this way, neoliberalism differs from classical liberal economics by posit-
ing the worker as an active subject, making “rational choices,” engaged in 
competition with others for access to “scarce resources,” instead of as an 
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“object of supply and demand in the form of labor power” (Foucault 2008: 
223; emphasis added). Here, wages are seen not as the price in exchange for 
labor-power but as a return on investment in one’s “human capital.”
Foucault’s thesis was that power lies at the heart of both liberal theo-
ries of sovereignty and Marxist conceptions of class domination. As Thomas 
Lemke (2002: 51) explains: “While the former [liberals] claim that legitimate 
authority is codified in law and it is rooted in a theory of rights, the latter 
[Marxists] locates power in the economy and regards the state as an instru-
ment of the bourgeoisie.” In his later work, Foucault sought to displace these 
two conceptions of power. Through his discussion of neoliberalism, human 
capital, and the entrepreneurial agency of the neoliberal subject, Foucault 
advances a conception of subjectivity that relies less on juridico-political and 
class models of power. Rather, the neoliberal, entrepreneurial subject as 
human capital is, according to Foucault, a subject that self-authorizes. As 
Andrew Dilts (2011: 145; emphasis added) puts it, “For Foucault, the neo-
liberal account of human capital opens the grounds of subjectivity, redirects 
his attention beyond the ways in which we are made subjects by force rela-
tions and allows him to think about the role that subjects play in their own 
formation.” Because neoliberals emphasize the role of (“rational”) choice, 
there is a sense in which the subject here is formed freely and is interpel-
lated, not by ideology or by repression but by the immanent truth effects of 
the neoliberal economy. What Foucault finds in the theory of human capital 
is a material conception of subjectivity that moves beyond Marxist and lib-
eral conceptions of ideology and subjectivity. The neoliberal subject, for Fou-
cault, is an effect of the truth regime of neoliberal governmentality.
Human capital refers to “everything that in one way or another can be 
a source of future income”; that is, it consists of “all of those physical and psy-
chological factors which make someone able to earn this or that wage” (Fou-
cault 2008: 224). One may invest in his or her human capital through prac-
tices of consumption; but consumption is taken as a productive activity. 
Neoliberalism sees people as “investors in themselves” and, therefore, “treats 
people not as consumers but as producers” (Feher 2009: 30). Time spent on 
the production of reputation is an important element of investing in the Self. 
The subjectivization of workers, from this perspective, comes through the 
active agency of investing in the Self, making us all an entrepreneurial Self, 
or an entrepreneur-of-the-Self. For the neoliberal subject, as an entrepre-
neur-of-the-Self in competition with other neoliberal subjects and constantly 
investing in his or her human capital, everything, “from marriage, to crime, 
to expenditures on children, can be understood ‘economically’ according to 
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a particular calculation of cost for benefit” (Read 2009: 28). This, according 
to Jason Read (2009: 28), means that we have to drastically rethink and 
expand the category of labor in neoliberalism: “Any activity that increases 
the capacity to earn income . . . is an investment in human capital.”
Foucault’s objective, according to Read (2009: 28), “is not to bemoan 
[the neoliberal conception of human capital] as a victory for capitalist ideol-
ogy . . . so much so that everyone from a minimum wage employee to a 
C.E.O. considers themselves to be entrepreneurs.” Instead, Foucault’s project 
demonstrates how neoliberalism represents a new “regime of truth,” com-
plete with its own form of subjectivization: homo oeconomicus, or the “entre-
preneurial subject” (Read 2009: 28), distinguished from homo juridicus, or 
the “legal subject of the state.” No longer is the subject guided by rights and 
laws; for homo oeconomicus, investment and competition are activities that 
render the subject into a position of self-control through self-reflexivity and 
the production of the Self as entrepreneur. Now, “the worker, on his own ini-
tiative, is supposed to guarantee the formation, growth, accumulation, 
improvement, and valorization of the ‘self’ as ‘capital’” (Lazzarato 2012: 91).
The conditions for enacting this conception of the neoliberal subject 
have been put into practice through varying austerity measures and the dis-
mantling of the post-war welfare state. That is, through the “contemporary 
trend away from long term labor contracts, [and] towards temporary and 
part-time labor,” and through austerity measures that turn needs (formerly 
subsidized by the state) and basic resources into exchange values, the neolib-
eral entrepreneurial subject has no choice but to practice an ethic of invest-
ing in the Self, in human capital, and to enter into relations of competition. 
As Read (2009: 30) puts it, this has been an “effective strategy of subjectifi-
cation” that encourages workers to avoid seeing themselves as workers, and 
to view themselves instead as “companies of one.”
Digital Labor and the Internet Prosumer Commodity
How does this logic of investing in one’s own human capital, of investing in 
the Self, impact the way that we use social media? Consider, for instance, the 
types of activities in which one engages through social media. We “share” 
articles, images, and memes; we “like” or “favorite” content posted by others; 
we can write about our thoughts, our opinions, and create short polemics (in 
140 characters or less on Twitter); we can also, and importantly, “follow” and 
“friend” others, creating a social network. All of these activities—of which 
this is only a small account—help to produce the Self on social media. The 
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profile page is a register of all of our activities, all of our comments and 
posts, and, importantly, all of the networks to which we connect that makes 
our production of Self much more durable and representable, and therefore 
“objectifiable.” Further, we act as curators of our profiles: we invest time in 
reading through articles (or, at the very least, the title of articles) before we 
post them; we invest time in deciding what to say in our status updates; we 
invest time in building (and maintaining) a network that makes us appear 
desirable to others; all of which requires us to be rather self-reflexive if we are 
interested in producing a Self that is to be desired by others, and which will 
help us develop a desired reputation. Suffice it to say that a lot of work goes 
into the construction of the Self and one’s digital reputation in social media.
Like all activities in the neoliberal context, using social media should 
be seen as a form of work or labor. But how might we conceive social media 
labor when it is viewed predominantly as a leisure activity? Writing about 
Facebook, Christian Fuchs (2014) notes that user-generated data—data 
about users—is compiled by the site and transformed into an “Internet pro-
sumer commodity,” not unlike the audience commodity. Fuchs concedes the 
fact that it is difficult to perceive the existence of exploitation on social media 
sites like Facebook. However, he argues that forms similar to that of com-
modity fetishism mask the exploitative aspects of corporate social media. It 
is precisely the commodity form of Facebook that hides the production of 
exchange value behind the veil of use values. The Facebook platform is cre-
ated as a use value that satisfies users’ communicative and social needs but 
at the same time serves Facebook’s profit interests (Fuchs 2014: 257). The 
“object-status” of users—that is, the commodification of users’ contribu-
tions to the profitability of the site—remains concealed by the production of 
the social network (261). Social media users are therefore, according to 
Fuchs, workers: “The online work they perform on social media is informa-
tional work, affective work, cognitive work, communicative work and collab-
orative work. This work creates profiles, content, transaction data and social 
relations” (265). But, also, in order for social media platforms to work, “users 
need to be quite active, social, creative and networked” (265).
Fuchs and others thus demonstrate the way that users’ activity on cor-
porate social media is in actuality a form of exploited and alienated labor, 
which the presentation of social media use as a leisure activity obscures. Yet 
in the context of corporate, for-profit platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, the 
data and information that users provide, the profiles that they produce, and 
the content that they share contribute to the production of the Internet pro-
sumer commodity upon which these companies generate surplus value and 
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profit. Significantly, work, here, is conceived not as such but rather as play and 
leisure. It is also, in this sense, that the promotion of the Self through social 
media may not be seen as work—that is, as value-producing activity.
While I do not dispute the critical political economy approach to corpo-
rate social media represented by Fuchs’s research, my interests here lie more 
with the way in which users deal with their objectivization and commodifi-
cation. Fuchs, in fact, explains this quite well. Referring to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
categories of social, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital, Fuchs (2014: 
116) puts the matter thus: people make use of social media because it allows 
them access to (1) an accumulation of social relations (social capital); (2) an 
accumulation of qualifications, education, knowledge, etc. (cultural capital); 
and (3) an accumulation of reputation (symbolic capital). However, “the time 
that users spend on commercial social media platforms generating social, 
cultural and symbolic capital is the process of prosumer commodification 
transformed into economic capital. Labor time on commercial social media 
is the conversion of Bourdieusian social, cultural and symbolic capital into 
Marxian value and economic capital” (Fuchs 2014: 116). Two things follow 
from this situation: first, social media are designed to encourage users—by 
creating and fostering pleasurable incentives—to spend increasing amounts 
of time using the platform, voluntarily handing over data about themselves, 
and helping to create the prosumer commodity; second, the demands of the 
neoliberal labor market force users to employ social media as a means of fur-
ther accumulating and representing their social, cultural, and symbolic cap-
ital as part of the Self. 
Self-Management 2.0: A 24/7 Job
Fuchs notes that terms such as “social media and Web 2.0 were established 
around 2005 in order to characterize World Wide Web (www) platforms like 
social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn), blogs (e.g., Wordpress), 
wikis (e.g., Wikipedia), microblogs (e.g., Twitter, Weibo), and user-generated 
content sharing sites (e.g., Youtube)” (2013: 2). But more significantly, as 
Daniel Trottier explains (2014: 14; emphasis added), Web 2.0 services “are 
typically made up of individual profiles. In most cases, a user cannot simply 
visit a site like Facebook; they have to build a presence there. Profiles are a kind 
of biographical space, where users provide information about themselves.” 
Social media websites like Facebook, therefore, differ significantly from the 
Internet of the 1990s in that they limit anonymity and encourage the manu-
facture of individuality and Self-hood.
South Atlantic Quarterly
Published by Duke University Press
Flisfeder  •  The Entrepreneurial Subject and Social Media 561
Equally significant about social media, demonstrating its evolution 
beyond cyberspace, is the fact that they encourage users to construct identi-
ties more concretely than in previous iterations. As Geert Lovink (2011: 41) 
notes, social media and the rise of Web 2.0 provide “little freedom anymore 
to present yourself in multiple ways.” The combination of entrepreneurial 
incentives and the rise of the post-9/11 security state make masking one’s 
identity online nearly impossible—or at least more difficult: “the hedonistic 
excesses at the turn of the millennium were over by the 2001 financial crisis 
and 9/11 attacks. The war on terror aborted the desire for a serious parallel 
‘second self’ culture and instead gave rise to the global surveillance and con-
trol industry. . . . Web 2.0 tactically responded with coherent, singular identi-
ties in sync with the data owned by police, security, and financial institu-
tions” (Lovink 2011: 40).
Social media create an atmosphere that encourages the production of a 
realistic representation of the Self. For example, Lovink (2011: 40–41; empha-
sis added) explains that within Facebook there exists “a pathological dimen-
sion of commitment to the real self going hand in hand with the comfort of 
being only amongst friends in a safe, controlled environment. . . . Differ-
ences of choice are celebrated so long as they are confined to one ‘identity’.”3 
Confined to a single, realistic identity, and within the context of the neolib-
eral valorization of the entrepreneurial Self, social media have helped to gen-
erate a “self-management” wave, transforming into a “self-promotion 
machine” (Lovink 2011: 41–43; emphasis added). Managing one’s Self 
becomes a full-time job, which blurs the lines between professional and pri-
vate life: “in the competitive networking context of work, we are trained to 
present ourselves as the best, fastest, and smartest” (Lovink 2011: 42). The 
Self-management wave of Web 2.0, using the self-promotion machine of 
social media, has aided in extending the length of the working day, trans-
forming into what Jonathan Crary (2013: 9) refers to as “24/7 temporalities”: 
“it’s only recently,” Crary notes, “that the elaboration, the modeling of one’s 
personal and social identity, has been reorganized to conform to the unin-
terrupted operation of markets, information networks, and other systems.” 
Thus 24/7 renders “the idea of working without pause, without limits” 
(Crary 2013: 10).4
Social media also allow for the extension of the workday beyond all 
available working hours. There is no “off switch.” And although none of us 
can really be shopping, playing games, working, or blogging 24/7, today, no 
waking moment exists when we are not shopping, consuming, or using/
exploiting networks. The invasion of 24/7 temporalities becomes all-pervasive 
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(Crary 2013: 30). Social media and 24/7 temporalities thus speak to an envi-
ronment of productivity that does not stop and in which profit-generating 
activity operates 24/7 (Crary 2013: 62). They have a global reach, operating 
elsewhere while we sleep so that when we wake up, commands await us in our 
e-mail inboxes when we start the day. Even those activities that were only con-
ceived as acts of consumerism have now become productive “techniques of 
personalization” (Crary 2013: 72). Producing the Self is a labor-intensive oper-
ation, and we are constantly given incentives and prescriptions by consumer 
society to reinvent and manage our intricate identities. All of this is champi-
oned, however, as “entrepreneurial heroism,” which surmounts the asymme-
try between the individual and the “grid” (Crary 2013: 98). Everything that 
one does is now “deployed in the service of adding dollar or prestige value to 
one’s electronic identities” (Crary 2013: 99).5 In a world of constant competi-
tion, of total commodification, “reification has proceeded to the point where 
the individual has to invent a self-understanding that optimizes or facilitates 
their participation in digital milieus and speeds” and everyone “needs an 
online presence, needs 24/7 exposure, to avoid social ‘irrelevance’ or profes-
sional failure” (Crary 2013: 104).
Human Capital or the Reproduction of Labor-Power?
Today, 24/7 temporalities call into question how we imagine the structure 
and length of the working day. Usually, we think about the typical working 
day as something separate from leisure time. We use our time outside of 
work to eat, sleep, and relax, all of which contributes to the reproduction of 
our ability to work. Marx calls this period the time necessary for the repro-
duction of labor-power. The latter is an integral part of his analysis since it 
helps to explain why the price of wages appears fair in the labor market: the 
wage is the fair price for labor-power since it covers the costs of those materi-
als that we need to reproduce our ability to work—the cost of rent, transpor-
tation, food, clothing, etc.—that is, the commodity that workers are selling 
to the capitalist.6 Exploitation occurs not because workers are paid below the 
value of their labor-power but because workers are put to work for an amount 
of time in which they produce their own value plus an additional value for 
which they are not paid, which becomes the surplus value that is appropri-
ated by the capitalist.7
Workers use their earned wages to satisfy physiological needs, pay 
rent, pay for transportation; but they can also deploy wages to increase the 
value of labor-power—spend on education, physical health, and communica-
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tion technologies and gain access to social and cultural networks. In neolib-
eral terms, the laborer invests in her human capital. My claim, though, is that 
what the neoliberal ideology conceives as investing in human capital remains 
nothing more than what Marxists refer to as the reproduction of labor-power: 
consuming in order to reproduce the commodity that the laborer sells on the 
market to meet her means of subsistence.8 With neoliberalism, however, we 
begin to witness, on the one hand, a decreasing wage (in real terms) that is 
below the true value of labor-power as well as divestment from public infra-
structure and social services that helped to subsidize the cost of living. On 
the other hand, people are encouraged to borrow in order to invest further to 
increase the value of their labor-power/human capital. This works toward the 
transformation of nearly all activity into value-producing activity. Borrowing 
to invest: we see here, in parallel with the rise of the neoliberal entrepreneur-
ial subject, the emergence of the neoliberal debt economy.
As Silvia Federici (2014: 235) explains, “since the 1980s, a whole ideo-
logical campaign has been orchestrated that represents borrowing from 
banks to provide for one’s reproduction as a form of entrepreneurship, thus 
mystifying the class relation and the exploitation involved.” Added to this, we 
have seen processes of wage deflation, reductions in public spending, rising 
levels of personal debt, and precarious labor. According to Lazzarato (2012: 
94), these processes have contributed to the neoliberal conception of the 
entrepreneur-of-the-Self, whose activity is restricted to managing employ-
ability, debts, drops in wages, and the reduction of public services, all of 
which function according to the terms of business and competition.
Reproduction of labor-power is now seen as a wholly entrepreneurial 
activity, where both work and work on the self are reduced to a command to 
become one’s own boss, absorbing the risks and costs now externalized onto 
the rest of society by business interests and austerity governments. Neolib-
eral entrepreneurialism was promised as a form of liberation; instead, it has 
turned out to be a mechanism for downloading the costs and risks that nei-
ther businesses nor the state are willing to take (Lazzarato 2012: 93). As a 
result, more stress is placed on the individual entrepreneurial Self to add to 
his or her reputation, since this is the character upon which future income 
depends.
Given the overlap between the neoliberal ideology of human capital—
of investing in one’s human capital—and the Marxian category of the repro-
duction of labor-power, it is possible to conceive the production of human 
capital as less the production of subjectivity and more the production of 
the subject as an object-commodity, that of labor-power. Investing in one’s 
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human capital, in other words, is simply the neoliberal ideology speaking to 
the necessity to reproduce labor-power as an object.
Social media and the necessity to self-brand, however, pose a new 
problem. While one is involved in the reproduction of labor-power, a second 
object-commodity is being produced that operates as a mechanism for the 
sale and marketing of the first: the production of the Self as a brand identity, 
or in social media, the production of a public profile through which one may 
market oneself as a worker or as human capital (depending on one’s ideologi-
cal perspective). The production of the Self, I claim, is similar to what Tiziana 
Terranova (2004: 74) refers to as “supplementing,” that is, bringing home 
supplementary work: the increasing necessity of working outside of the tradi-
tional office. This, she explains, has been affected by the expansion of the 
Internet, which has given “ideological and material support to contemporary 
trends towards increased flexibility of the workforce, continuous reskilling 
[and] freelance work” (74). In the context of social media, the following ques-
tion needs to be addressed: does investment in the Self count only toward the 
reproduction of labor-power, or is the time invested in the reproduction of 
labor-power now also allocated to the production of Self as image/brand? In 
other words, can we now think of a triple division of the day, between (1) labor-
time, (2) time for the reproduction of labor-power, and (3) the time necessary 
for the marketing of labor-power and the promotion of the Self?
The Neoliberal Self as the Object of the Subject
It is difficult to conceive of user activity on social media both as a form of 
labor and as an objectivizing practice for a couple of reasons that are specific 
to postmodern capitalism. On the one hand, as I have already noted above, 
using social media appears as a form of play and entertainment; on the other 
hand, it appears to provide a platform for the construction of a Self as sub-
ject. Consumer culture and the rise of the information society have created 
the appearance of a free society outside of direct technocratic or authoritar-
ian control. Information communication technologies, for instance, have 
eased accessibility to knowledge, which has largely been democratized; fur-
thermore, the pleasure ethic, and the injunction to enjoy in consumer soci-
ety discredits the notion that our society is based on prohibition and repres-
sion. In fact, as Slavoj Žižek (1991) argues, postmodern society is one that 
is no longer based upon the prohibition to enjoy and is organized instead 
around the constant obligation to enjoy. In this sense, though they come 
from opposite perspectives, Žižek’s thought parallels Foucault’s in trying to 
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conceive subjectivization outside the operation of direct repression. This is 
the central problem for the postmodern critique of ideology: how to think 
the operations of ideology outside of mechanisms of direct and overt control.
The historicity of the postmodern subject is further destabilized by the 
perceived lack of alternatives to global capitalism. Mark Fisher (2009) 
describes this as “capitalist realism.” Drawing on the thesis, often attributed 
to Žižek and Fredric Jameson, that it is easier to imagine the end of the 
world than the end of capitalism, Fisher explains the reigning contemporary 
ideology not as a form of mystification, or even repression, but as a form of 
cynical realism. As Fisher (2009: 2) puts it, capitalist realism denotes “the 
widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and eco-
nomic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent 
alternative to it.” The “realism” of capitalist realism should be understood as 
the kind of response elicited when one proclaims the viability of alternatives 
to capitalism, the response that so many of us on the left receive from cynics 
who encourage us to “be realistic,” or to quit being so “idealistic.” As Fisher 
(2009: 5) puts it, this “realism” is “analogous to the deflationary perspective 
of a depressive who believes that any positive state, any hope, is a dangerous 
illusion.” This kind of cynicism, according to Žižek (1989), is precisely the 
form that ideology has taken in a supposedly “post-ideological” era.
Žižek (1989) defines cynicism as a mode of ideology by drawing on 
Octave Manoni’s formula for fetishism disavowal, “Je sais bien, mais quand 
même . . . ” (“I know very well, but nevertheless”). As I have argued elsewhere 
(Flisfeder 2014), there is a perverse core (in the strict Lacanian sense) to the 
form of ideology in postmodern society, and cynicism, as a form of fetishis-
tic disavowal, is the manner in which ideology continues to operate in digital 
culture. As Todd McGowan (2009: 29) explains, cynicism is “a mode of 
keeping alive the dream of successfully attaining the lost object [of desire] 
while fetishistically denying one’s investment in this idea.” But the danger of 
cynicism is that “it allows subjects to acknowledge the hopelessness of con-
sumption while simultaneously consuming with as much hope as the most 
naïve consumer” (29). It is here, I claim, through the cynical preservation of 
desire, that we can locate a conception of the subject that stands in opposi-
tion to the one proposed by Foucault in his lectures on neoliberalism. The 
apparent absence of prohibition has brought not the breakdown of Authority 
but rather the willing back into existence figures of Authority that preserve 
the subject’s ability to desire (since desire is only possible if it is posited in 
opposition to its prohibition; or, as Foucault [1990: 95] puts it, “where there 
is power, there is resistance”).
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New media and information communication technologies play a cen-
tral role in adding to the deconstruction of prohibition. Access to one’s desire 
is no longer prohibited by time or by the delay required to attain the lost 
object: everything is present, locatable in the database. This access, however, 
produces a dilemma for the desiring subject. New media and cyberspace are 
capable of potentially suffocating desire—desire is operative only insofar as 
the object desired remains (forever) lost. Cyberspace thus confronts the sub-
ject with the impossibility of desire since, as McGowan (2013: 67) puts it, 
“thanks to the emergence of cyberspace, the subject has the ability to experi-
ence its castration as the effect of its own desire rather than as the effect of 
an authority demanding sacrifice . . . . [Cyberspace] alters the subject’s aware-
ness of prohibition, and this not only disguises the working of the Law but 
also exposes the fundamental structure of desire.” Cyberspace, in other 
words, confronts the subject/user directly with the fact that (in Lacanian 
terms) the big Other does not exist—that power is not in fact (in accordance 
with Foucault) occupied by some agent or figure of Authority. However, as 
McGowan indicates, recognizing the absence of prohibition universalizes 
prohibition: in order to preserve desire from suffocation, the subject clings to 
power, willing it into existence. The perverse core of contemporary neolib-
eral subjectivity is that which, in order to preserve desire from suffocation, 
compels the subject to cling to some conception of the prohibiting agency.
How, then, to save desire from suffocation, given the context of the 
absence of prohibition, instant access, and abundance? Here we are able to 
begin thinking about the role of social media in preserving the agency of the 
big Other. Social media, I claim, are the manner in which capitalism has 
succeeded in reintroducing lack, scarcity, and Authority into a world of 
instant access and abundance. They are also a platform for re-positing the 
existence of the big Other through the network. Furthermore, it is by alienat-
ing oneself materially, through the production of a material signifier—the 
public profile; the signifier that represents the subject for another signifier—
that stands for both the production of the Other and the Self, in the spaces of 
social media. The subject produces the Self as signifier and object, rather 
than as subject—or, to borrow a phrase from Frank Smecker (2014), the sig-
nifier represents the Self as “the object of the subject.”
Here, we are dealing with alternative conceptions of subjectivity (the 
Foucauldian conception and the neo-Lacanian conception), and the way to 
resolve the contradiction between the two is to conceive the subject in the 
case of Foucault—human capital, the entrepreneur-of-the-Self—not as sub-
ject, but as object (precisely what Foucault does not want to do). What the 
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neoliberal subject produces is not himself or herself as subject, but the Self 
as object. Investing in one’s human capital is the production of the Self as 
object-commodity.
On the Becoming Subject of the Objectivized Self
I have been arguing that the Self represents the objectivization of the subject 
in two ways, contextualized by neoliberalism and social media. On the one 
hand, drawing upon Lacanian and neo-Lacanian conceptions of subjectivity, 
I have argued that the subject is objectivized through its alienation in the 
signifier, and in the order of the big Other, or the Symbolic order. Through 
social media, this process is enacted in the production of the public profile 
and its presentation, performance, and exhibition on the social network. The 
construction of the public profile and participation in the social network are 
two aspects of the desire to will back into existence some figure of Authority 
or prohibition on which the subject is able to constitute his or her desire, a 
figure of prohibition that appears lacking in the context of postmodern con-
sumer society but that makes all desire possible. On the other hand, the sub-
ject is objectivized through the production of a Self as brand image. The Self 
is, in this sense, an object-commodity that is put to use in the service of Self-
promotion. The latter is a condition, in an atmosphere of precarious labor, 
for the further accumulation of paid work. I have suggested that the working 
day is now divided into three parts: labor-time, time for the reproduction of 
labor-power, and the time necessary for the promotion of labor-power and the 
reputation of the Self. Social media mask the latter as the production of sub-
jectivity and are in this sense comparable to commodity fetishism in its tra-
ditional definition. The question remains, though: if all activity is objectiv-
izing activity, where can we locate the subject? Which notion of subjectivity 
is adequate for thinking the objectivizing operations of neoliberalism and 
social media labor?
I have argued, against Foucault, that investing in one’s human capital 
is not, in fact, a subject-producing activity; despite the fact that Foucault 
intended to posit the subject as a category of domination, I have argued 
instead that neoliberalism extends the reification of the subject and that this 
objectivization results in both the exploitation and domination of the subject. 
Subjectivity in the sense that I have in mind is therefore much closer to the 
nonreified consciousness of what traditional Marxism refers to as proletarian 
class consciousness. But we need not necessarily discard the Foucauldian 
conception of subjectivity. Instead, we should posit his as the ideological form 
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of subjectivity (one reason why his account is so convincing) while at the same 
time invoking a conception of proletarian subjectivity, which is what is truly 
at stake in critical ideological analysis.
The subject posited by Foucault represents the individual caught in 
ideology insofar as it misrecognizes its objectivization as a condition of its 
subjectivization. Now, my claim is that it is not simply possible to reveal to 
the subject the fact of its objectivization in the circuits of exploitation, 
since—for starters—the realism of “capitalist realism” makes this a known 
fact. The subject’s sense for the preservation of desire also binds her to the 
existing relations of domination and power in order to preserve her desire. 
In this essay, I have demonstrated that the neoliberal Self does not produce 
herself as subject but rather further objectivizes her life as a condition of 
exploitation in neoliberal capitalism; furthermore, the traditional categories 
of Marxist analysis—alienation, reification, commodity fetishism, reproduc-
tion of labor-power, absolute and relative surplus value—still provide a much 
more adequate means of conceptualizing subjectivization and exploitation, 
even in neoliberal conditions, than the theory of human capital.
The shift that has accompanied neoliberalism, therefore, has been not 
at the level of subjectivity but—and Foucault is correct in at least this 
regard—with the material practices that have accompanied the resurgence 
of the capitalist class in the post-welfare state period. Domination and con-
trol have become increasingly self-imposed, and the Self-promotional aspect 
of social media—their use as a tool to further objectivize, reify, commodify, 
and sell the Self—plays a central part in this process under the conditions of 
twenty-first-century capitalism.
Notes
 1 In the Lacanian sense, the signifier is the signifier of a lack that is the subject. The 
subject represents the lack or gap in the Symbolic order. The latter represents what 
Lacan referred to as the “big Other” (grand Autre). It is the order of meaning and sig-
nification, often reified in cultural, social, and political institutions. While the big 
Other does not exist in actuality, its existence must be posited in order to guarantee 
community and communication.
 2 We should also take note of the wide range of social media analytics tools and applica-
tions now available for users to measure and evaluate their reach and reputation across 
various social media platforms, such as Klout, SumAll, and Google Analytics. Other 
applications, such as Twalue.com, also allow users to see an estimate of their monetary 
value on social media sites, that is, how much revenue they bring in for the company.
 3 Lovink also comments critically on Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s statement that 
“having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity” (cited in 
Lovink 2011: 41).
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 4 The Marxist argument here should also note the extension of absolute surplus value 
as mechanisms emerge to draw out relative surplus value.
 5 The online application twalue.com measures the value of one’s Twitter account. Users 
have the option of posting this to their Twitter feed. This can have the effect of either 
helping to sell the Self (i.e., “this is what I’m worth”) or encouraging competition 
between users to amass more followers and to create more posts; all the while, the profit 
generated continues to be alienated from the prosumer. Klout.com also allows users to 
measure the degree of impact that they have across various social media platforms.
 6 “[T]he value of labor-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the 
maintenance of its owner” (Marx 1990: 274).
 7 Therefore, as David Harvey (2010: 102) explains, the laborer as subject of exchange 
still exists within the cycle, C-M-C (commodity—money—commodity), whereas for 
the capitalist, the cycle is that of M-C-M1 (money—commodity—M1=M+ΔM, where 
ΔM is surplus value).
 8 Harvey (2010: 103) also notes the fact that “needs” are historical, dependent upon the 
history of class struggle.
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